The Georgian Dilemma

On August 8th, 2008, the same day the Olympics opened in Beijing, the news headlines were dominated by stories of Russian troops rolling into the South Ossetia region of Georgia. Russia began bombing Georgian targets the previous day, in response to a Georgian offensive againsts separatist groups in South Ossetia. The Chinese hoped that beginning the Olympics on 8/8/08 would bring luck, but eight turned out to be Georgia’s unlucky number.

The Bush administration immediately reacted against the apparent Russian invasion of Georgia, calling it “unacceptable”. (1) Bush and Condoleezza Rice framed the invasion as an act of naked aggression against a smaller sovereign state, and the American news media followed suit. Conservatives may complain of a liberal bias in journalism, but journalists are really more biased toward a good storyline than they are to a political ideology. Bush served up an attractive David-versus-Goliath storyline, and the news outlets gobbled it up.

For their part, Russia sternly denied any wrongdoing. In the view of Russian president Dmitriy Medvedev, they were only reacting to Georgian aggression in the semi-independent region of South Ossetia. Georgia’s government had begun to crack down on separatist rebels, whom they accused of breaking a cease-fire. This crackdown, says Russia, was a humanitarian disaster which left thousands dead. Even the West-friendly Mikhail Gorbachev defended Russia’s action. (2)

More than a week has passed since the Russian assault, which may allow us to gain a little perspective on the situation. As is often the case, it is not as simple as president Bush made it out to be. No hands are clean in this saga, and it will be extremely difficult to disentangle the opposing interests.

Georgia has had a long-running dispute about the independence of two territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia is friendly with both disputed regions and has provided them materiel support. If South Ossetia and Abkhazia officially cut ties with Georgia, they would be allied with Moscow. The United Nations has not recognized either territory as independent, and the world at large considers them to be part of Georgia.

Georgia’s attack on the separatists produced reports of great destruction and massive casualties, especially in Tbilisi. Eye witnesses reported artillery and rocket attacks that killed women and children, and “bodies lying on the streets, around ruined buildings.” (3) With these reports, Russia can back its claim of humanitarian intervention.

Before we swing our opinions away from Georgia and toward Russia, we should fully examine Georgia’s statements. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili has framed the skirmish as a battle between the democratic Georgia and the authoritarian Russia. Russia, in his view, is trying to retake the former Soviet satellite states. Saakashvili says that a successful Russian adventure in Georgia “would mark the end of Western influence on any of the former Soviet republics.” (4) It is a plausible claim which many in the United States are eager to believe.

Moreover, the West has a material interest in the Georgian conflict. The Times Online reports: “Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oil from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.” (5) Russian control of oil pipelines would be a strategic boon for Moscow, and create potential future crises for NATO and EU countries. In a worst-case scenario, Russian control of oil resources could spark a new Cold War. The prospect is making the entire continent nervous. Poland quickly inked a deal with the United States to host part of the U.S. missile defense network. The move prompted Russia to issue a warning to Poland, another former Soviet satellite. (6)

French president Nicolas Sarkozy swooped in like Superman to save the day. At least, he postponed doomsday for a few more months. He managed to get both sides to sign a simple six-part peace deal that would end all hostilities and allow Russia to act as peacekeepers “while awaiting an international mechanism.” (7) This buys some time and gives all parties some breathing room, and it paves the way for an international peacekeeping force.

With this breathing room, we can look back and try to assess what really happened. Details are still sketchy, and the available facts depend on whom you ask. Georgia acted militarily against separatists in South Ossetia, and they should be held responsible for any deaths and damage caused by that action. On the other hand, Russian claims of mass carnage appear to be greatly exaggerated. Human Rights Watch does not buy Moscow’s estimate of 2,000 dead, and places the number at 44. (8) Even so, forty-four souls are too many.

If Medvedev is exaggerating the death toll, why is he doing so? The exaggeration would seem to support the Georgian assertion that the anti-separatist crackdown in South Ossetia was only an excuse for a Russian invasion of Georgia proper. Moscow’s case is also hurt by Russia’s attacks in other parts of Georgia, including the destruction of the Black Sea port Poti. (9) Why would Russia target sites unrelated to South Ossetia? Abkhazia has also risen in armed revolt, apparently supported by Russian troops and weapons. (10) It is hard to square the deeds of Russia with her words.

Christopher Hitchens points out that the Russians may have telegraphed their intentions in Georgia (11). In his Slate article, he sites a report in The Guardian that suggests the action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia may be retaliation for American support of Kosovo's independence. (12) Russian Prime Minsister Vladimir Putin did not directly say that Russia would reciprocate, but he responded vaguely, saying they would "react to preserve our interests." He made comparisons to Great Britain's determination to maintain territorial intengrity in Northern Ireland. For Hitchens, Putin's words are the smoking gun.

Georgia’s pleas of innocence do not wash, nor do Russia’s declarations of heroic humanitarian intervention. Only after time passes and the evidence is dispassionately examined can we determine who was more wrong. For now, there is an uncomfortable fact that Russia may have a hard time digesting: even if they are telling the truth about Georgia’s aggression, the West is still not likely to support their response. The sovereignty of former Soviet nations is a highly sensitive subject for the United States and her allies. Not long ago, Georgia was considered for NATO membership, and she hopes to eventually join the European Union. If Eastern Europe slides back into Russia’s sphere of influence, it could set off an expensive and unpredictable security dilemma that the West would prefer to avoid. That is not to say that nothing should be done about Georgia’s harsh tactics in South Ossetia, but the Russian response is disproportionate and not in line with the interests of the international community.

For now, the best case scenario would be for an international peacekeeping force to place itself between Russia and Georgia in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If the people of the two secessionist regions want independence, it will be nearly impossible for Georgia to prevent them from attaining their goal. It would have to happen following negotiations over oil transit. Russia could make an act of good faith by renouncing any desire to disrupt the flow of resources through Georgian territory.

What is not useful right now is the knee-jerk anti-Russian reaction spurred by the Bush administration. Russia’s justifications may be exaggerated, but that does not absolve Georgia. U.S. negotiators should be working to de-escalate the situation, not drawing a line in the sand and daring Russia to cross it. Russia must have a face-saving alternative, or they will continue to meet American escalations with escalations of their own. To paraphrase Khrushchev, the the Georgian knot will become so tight that it will have to be cut.

© 2008 Bryan Lower

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