11 March, 2008
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Surge Protector


By Bryan Lower

In January of 2007, President Bush ignored the recommendations of experts and distressed military families to reduce American troops’ exposure to violence in Iraq. The occupation of Iraq had become a political hot potato. Even the president knew that a new strategy was needed, but he chose to go in the opposite direction that many had suggested. The man does not govern based on polls.

More troops were sent to the embattled country. We were told this was not an “escalation”. That word evoked memories of Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam, a comparison the neocons have been desperate to avoid. No, this was a “surge”, implying that it would be temporary. The label stuck. Most news outlets dutifully call the addition of combat troops a “surge”, but the word is sometimes used with a little wink-wink, because we all know what it really is.

Since the escalation, violence in Iraq has eased slightly. The Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, supported the surge, and is banking on its success to boost his bid for the Whit House. The meme that is crossing the news wires is that the surge has worked, and bringing troops home now would only increase the violence. The Democratic presidential candidates, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, have both been confronted with questions about their opposition to the supposedly successful surge.

Let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Most Americans now agree, though some have come along slowly, that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. In addition, the planning of the invasion and the post-war occupation were shockingly bad. More troops, perhaps twice as many as were originally deployed, were needed to secure the country. Since Rumsfeld tried to take Iraq on the cheap, insurgents and foreign fighters were able to gain a foothold. If you’re going to take on an adventure like Iraq, you are limiting your chances for success if you go in half-cocked. Under those conditions, of course more troops would help. But you can’t unhammer the nail. The mistake was made. Adding more troops now does not necessarily undue the damage.

There was an important event that preceded the escalation. In August 2007, the Mehdi Army, one of the largest militias in Iraq, announced a six month cease-fire. (1) General Petraeus was under pressure to reduce casualties. To do so, he negotiated deals with insurgent groups, and agreed to pay former militia members $10 a day to participate in “Concerned Local Citizens” programs (CLCs). (2) Instead of shooting at American soldiers, they would patrol their own neighborhoods. It was an unusual and expensive arrangement, but an effective one. The influx of American troops no doubt helped to reduce the violence, but the best remedy is to convince insurgents to stop fighting.

The six month cease-fire was due to end in February, but Mehdi leader Maqtada al-Sadr extended it for another six months. (3)

How effective are cease-fires with insurgent militias? How much control does al-Sadr really have over his troops? It is difficult to say, but it would be wishful thinking to expect the respite to continue indefinitely. All parties in Iraq have political expectations, grudges, religious friction, and dead family members to avenge. It is too much to ask them to set aside their demands for $10 a day. Al-Sadr confessed that his influence over his militia is waning. (4) If the cease-fire falls apart, the burden of Iraqi security would again fall on U.S. troops. Then we could really see the effectiveness of the escalation.

Yesterday, violence returned to Iraq. Eight American soldiers were killed in two bombings. (5) A teenage girl blew herself up, killing a sheik and a small child. Is this a breach in the cease-fire? Are these the acts of an independent group? For the families of the slain it does not matter. For the success of the escalation, it does not matter. To claim progress, violence must remain low. The rationale for the escalation was to buy time for the glacially slow Iraqi government to consolidate power and resolve some sticky political conflicts. If the attacks continue, any benefits of the escalation will be wiped out.

There are hard choices to face. The Iraq was a bad idea from the beginning, and it continues to be a bad idea. It has cost the United States its prestige around the world, the support of allies, and the ability to fight against the terrorist group that attacked us on September 11th, 2001. It has cost us billions of dollars and thousands of soldiers. It has cost the Iraqis an as-yet-unknown number of lives. If we leave, the situation in Iraq may very well become worse. If we say, it is likely to become worse anyway. There will be fallout from an American withdrawal from Iraq, but we cannot hope to rebuild our international support and regroup for the fight against al Qaeda until we end the occupation of Iraq. The Vietnam comparison is fair. We could not win the Cold War as long as we were mired in that misadventure. We cannot win the war on terror as long as we throw our resources into the bottomless pit that Iraq has become.


Sources:
  1. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article2349420.ece
  2. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543
  3. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543
  4. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543
  5. http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/10/iraq.main/index.html?iref=newssearch

© 2008 Bryan Lower


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